报告题目：Behavior-Based Pricing in Congestion-Prone Systems
报告人：天津大学 王钟彬 副教授
Problem definition:Recent years have witnessed the widespread use of data to recognize repeat and new consumers to offer them different prices, i.e., behavior-based pricing (BBP). While extant research has examined the impacts of BBP on the market, most of this research ignores the congestion effect in serving each consumer. This research extends the literature by investigating the effect of promised delay (PD) on platforms and consumers to reveal the implications of BBP in congestion-prone systems. Methodology/results: We establish a two-period dynamic game-theoretic duopoly model embedded with a queueing system, where a PD that captures the service quality is committed to consumers before the start of the sales season. We uncover that the heterogeneity of PD fundamentally affects the impacts of BBP. First, we find that BBP may benefit the platform that provides a lower service quality because of the free riding effect. Second, contrary to the conventional wisdom that BBP always reduces social welfare because of inefficient consumer switching in the second period, we reveal that, somewhat surprisingly, overall social welfare can be improved by using BBP due to the load balancing effect. Third, when PD decisions are endogenized, the practice of BBP may lower the service quality and increase the operational efficiency of the industry in the long run, reversing its benefit to consumers but improving the payoffs of platforms. Moreover, endogenized PD results in a Matthew effect where the platform with higher base value commits to a lower PD. BBP exacerbates this effect and further widens the quality gap between platforms. Managerial implications: In a congestion-prone system with endogenous PD decisions, both platforms have an incentive to practice BBP when the marginal capacity cost is relatively large, and social welfare can be improved through BBP if the difference in base values between the two platforms is large. However, we caution that BBP should be forbidden by the social planner when the marginal capacity cost is intermediate because neither platforms nor consumers can benefit from it.
王钟彬，现就职于天津大学管理与经济学部，担任英才副教授。主要研究方向为运营管理，排队经济学，以及平台经济下的供应链管理。主持国家自然科学基金青年基金1项，中国科协青年人才托举工程项目1项，博士后项目1项，以主要参与人参与国家自然科学基金重点项目1项。以第一作者或通讯作者发表高水平论文10余篇，其中在运营管理类国际顶尖刊物《Operations Research》,《Management Science》,《Manufacturing & Service Operations Management》，《Production and Operations Management》等发表数篇学术论文。相关学术成果曾获2022年“全国供应链与运营管理”最佳会议论文一等奖，2021年美国运筹学与管理学研究协会(INFORMS)服务科学最佳论文一等奖，2021年第十三届“行为运筹学与行为运营管理”研讨会青年教师优秀论文奖，中国系统工程学会第六届“系统科学与系统工程科学技术奖”优博奖，以及2021年管理科学与工程学会“优秀博士学位论文奖励计划”。